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A JURY OF ONE'S PEERS
LEwis H. LARUE*

The Sixth Amendment provides that:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. .. .
The problem is how to interpret the phrase: "an impartial jury."
It is easy to say that "impartial" means "not partial" and then conclude from the dictionary meaning' of "partial" that the evil to be
avoided is jurors who have already taken sides. In other words, we
want to exclude from juries those who have already made up their
minds about a case; we want jurors to decide cases upon the evidence
introduced in court and not upon what they have heard in other
places.
A more difficult question is whether "impartial" means "disinterested." It is interesting to note that "partial" is derived from the
same Latin root as is the word "peer."' 2 Etymology alone proves nothing, yet there is some irony in speaking not only of an impartial jury
but also of a jury of peers. A plunkish etymological argument is that
it is inconsistent to require a jury to be impartial and then also
require it to be made up of peers, since by a strained etymology "notpartial" means "not peers." Moving away from etymology, let us ask
the common sense question of why anyone would want a jury of
peers? Presumably, he hopes to get a more friendly jury, a jury more
likely to take his side, and so there does seem to be an inconsistency.
However, a more cautious approach is to remember the poet's
dictum, "All Discord, Harmony not understood."' There may be
some doubt as to whether the poet is right or wrong as a general
position, but he is right in this particular matter. The inconsistency
or "discord" in saying that we want a jury that is impartial but not
too impartial makes sense. The sense that it makes goes something
like this: we want a jury that has something in common with the
defendant but no stake in his case. There is one thing that the jury
must not have in common with the defendant: a particular interest
or stake in the outcome of the case similar to the defendant's interest.
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University, A.B. Washington & Lee
University (1959); LL.B. Harvard University (1962).
1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, sense 1 for the word "partial."
2 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, pp. 955, 966 and
1534.
3 ALEXANDER POPE, ESSAY ON MAN, Epistle I, line 291.
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Otherwise, it is good for the jury to have things in common with the
accused, since this will help them understand and thus evaluate what
the accused says in court.' This is my thesis, and the problem is how
to test it.
Perhaps the best way to approach a test is by taking an actual
case.5 The accused was a twenty-three year old black male charged
with armed robbery. The place of the alleged crime was Jacksonville,
Onslow County, North Carolina. The victim was a young, black enlisted man in the U.S. Marine Corps stationed at Camp Lejeune,
which is also in Onslow County. The accused was a pimp; he was selfemployed in Jacksonville. The accused and the victim agreed on
certain facts: the two of them got into a car, together with a young
woman who was also black, in downtown Jacksonville. The three
then drove to the accused's apartment where the victim handed
money to the young woman. Then they drove back to where the
journey began and the victim got out of the car. However, there was
a conflict in the testimony as to why the victim handed the money
to the young woman. The victim said that the accused had a weapon
and threatened to use it unless money was produced. The accused
denied this and said that the money was handed over in the regular
course of an agreed upon, albeit illegal, commercial transaction between the young woman and the victim.
The fundamental issue was credibility. Whose story should the
jury believe? The accused took the stand, and the jury's decision as
to his truthfulness was surely influenced by their reaction to him. The
jury had to decide what sort of man he. was. Was the accused an
honest pimp, supplying that which he had agreed to supply; or was
he a dishonest pimp, promising to supply so as to lure victims to
places where he could rob them? If the jurors despised pimps, and
thus found the accused so despicable that they could not understand
how there could be a difference between an honest pimp and a
dishonest pimp, then they would be emotionally blocked from reaching the issue.
Furthermore, the credibility problem could not be decided by
putting the testimony into collocation with other testimony or with
circumstantial evidence and seeing which testimony was more plausiCompare the words of Justice Brandeis: "knowledge is essential to understanding; and understanding should precede judging." Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264
U.S. 504, at 520 (1924) (dissenting opinion).
A former student of mine, Jeffrey Stephen Miller, J.D. Washington & Lee 1975,
participated in this case while working as a summer clerk. Mr. Miller brought the case
to my attention; his sense of outrage about it provoked me to write this article.
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ble in the larger context. The only other witness who had direct
knowledge of the facts was the young woman. Her story agreed with
that of the accused; but since he was her pimp and she was his
prostitute, the agreement in their testimony adds nothing. A circumstance that favored the accused was that when he was arrested later
that night, he did not have a weapon. However, the probative force
of this was lessened by the time lapse of several hours between the
transaction and the arrest. Another circumstance that favored the
accused was that on the ride from downtown to the apartment and
then on the ride back, the accused drove the car, the young woman
sat in front with him, and the victim sat in the back of the car. In
the movies, gangsters don't do it that way, and real-life gangsters
often learn how to be gangsters from watching the movies. However,
life does sometimes differ from art, the victim was eighteen, the accused was twenty-three, and fear is fear. The use of this fact turns
upon the credibility of the victim's story that he was afraid. One can
be afraid sitting alone in a back seat. A circumstance that hurt the
accused was the the amount of money that changed hands was
seventy-six dollars. This price was well above what was customary in
that market, however the value of this evidence was lessened by the
fact that the victim's youth and inexperience could have made him
an easy mark.
What type of jury would be most competent to try this case? We
can imagine several possibilities. One of the most interesting possibilities would be six black Marines from Camp Lejeune who normally
use services similar to those supplied by the accused, and six black
entrepreneurs of Jacksonville who usually supply services similar to
those supplied by the accused. The actual jury before which the
accused was tried was as different from this as one could imagine.
The panel from which the jury was drawn was apparently selected so
as to be a cross-section of Onslow County, and the names for the trial
panel were apparently selected by random methods from the master
panel. By a fluke of chance,6 the jury was all white, all female, all
middle-class in income, all in the fourth decade of their life or older,
and all regular attenders of a fundamentalist protestant church. The
accused was convicted.
This conviction raises nagging doubts. One does not know if the
accused was guilty or innocent, but it is difficult to believe that the
trial was fair. The crucial issue was credibility, and credibility turns
I I am accepting Mr. Miller's judgment that this jury was atypical and that there
was no evidence of official misconduct, although the latter is hard to believe.
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upon the use of the eye. One must watch the telling of the stories and
then choose among them because of the way in which they are told.
The eye that watches must not be hostile. There must be knowledge
and then understanding before there can be judging.7
Even so, by the standards of positive law, there is no reversible
error.' We do not require a jury of peers in any ancient or modem
sense of the word "peers." We have given this ancient requirement a
peculiarly American twist; in place of "peers" we have substituted
"a representative cross-section of the community."' Furthermore, we
do not summon a representative cross-section for any particular trial.
Instead, a master list of potential jurors is drawn up and this master
list is what is supposed to be a representative cross-section. The
procedure that we use can best be described by saying that the jury
that hears the case has passed through three filters. The community
at large is filtered into a master list. The jury commissioners who
draw up this list are supposed to use procedures that will generate a
list that is a representative cross-section of the community. The master list is filtered into a jury panel. The court official who draws this
panel is supposed to use random selection techniques. The panel is
filtered into a trial jury by the attorneys through the exercise of
challenges.
The procedure described above is more abstract and schematic
than the reality of jury selection. However, it is an accurate description of our ideal, and it is a norm by which judges criticize practice.'"
This procedure is supposed to implement our orthodoxy, which is
that the accused is entitled to a jury from which no part of the
community has been excluded, but the accused is not entitled to a
jury that includes any particular part of society. Putting this in current terms a black is entitled to have a master list with a reasonable
number of blacks on it, but he is not entitled to have a trial jury with
blacks on it. The first filter must pass blacks, but not the second or
third. It is thus necessary to inquire into the history and rationale of
our orthodoxy.
Our orthodoxy has not changed in any substantial way since 1880.
In that year the Supreme Court decided three cases that have been
honored ever since. In Ex parte Virginia" and Strauder v. West
See note 4, supra.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692, 702 (1975).
Id. at 696-698.
,OSee Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692, 692-702 (1975).
100 U.S. 339 (1880).
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Virginia2 blacks were excluded from jury service, and in both of these
cases the court said that the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable
to the situation. In Ex parte Virginia, a state court judge was accused
of refusing to select any blacks for service on juries in Pittsylvania
County, Virginia. He was indicted under a federal statute, and the
court held that Congress had authority to punish such conduct under
its power to make appropriate legislation to enforce the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Strauder v. West
Virginia, a state statute excluded blacks from jury service. A federal
statute provided that anyone who could not enforce his rights to equal
civil rights in state courts could remove his case to federal court. A
black defendant asked that his case be removed, and the court held
that Congress had the power to provide for removal in such cases.
However, in Virginia v. Rives, 3 two black defendants who were
charged with murdering a white man, indicted by an all-white grand
jury, and tried by an all-white petit jury, were unable to get any relief
from the Supreme Court. The defendants had made two motions in
the state court prior to trial and both motions were denied. The first
motion was to have one-third of the venire be composed of blacks,
and when this was denied, the second motion was to remove the case
to federal court, which was also denied. The Supreme Court held that
there was no error in denying either motion. The accused did not
allege or prove that anyone had done anything to cause the absence
of blacks on the jury; on the evidence set out in the record of the case,
the hypothesis of no blacks because of chance was just as likely as
the hypothesis of no blacks because of discrimination.
In Virginia v. Rives, the court summed up its view of the law by
saying:
It is a right to which every colored man is entitled, that, in the
selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or property,
there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination
against them because of their color. But this is a different thing
from the right which it is asserted was denied to the petitioners
by the State court, viz. a right to have the jury composed in
part of colored men. 4
At least one thing that the court said is correct-the two rights are
different rights. The first mentioned right is the remedial corollary
of a duty that is negative, i.e., thou shalt not exclude blacks from
12 100

"

U.S. 303 (1880).

100 U.S. 313 (1880).
Id. at 322-323.
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juries. The second mentioned right is the remedial corollary of a duty
that is affirmative, -i.e., thou shall include blacks in juries. But so
what? Why not grant both rights? The only explanation that was
offered in this case was the cryptic comment:
A mixed jury in a particular case is not essential to the equal
protection of the laws ....
11
The opinion contained no arguments that attempted to justify this
conclusion ("not essential") and so one must return to the other two
cases for clues.
Justice Strong's opinion for the majority in Straudersets out the
reasons for holding that the exclusion of blacks from juries is a violation of the rights of the black defendant. Justice Strong pointed out
that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect blacks
against discrimination; 8 he then said:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute all rights to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, . . . is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of
their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which
is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers
or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned
to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he
holds.
It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular
classes in the community, which sway the judgment of ju17
rors ....
These three excerpts set out three different reasons for condemning the exclusion of blacks from juries. First, political dynamics: the
exclusion will be interpreted by all as a state-affixed stigmata and
will handicap blacks in their general pursuit of equal justice. Second,
definitional: a jury is a jury of peers, and the exclusion eliminates
'5

Id. at 323.
100 U.S. 306-07.
Id. at 308-09.
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peers. Third, fact finding: prejudice can distort the fact finding, and
if blacks are excluded, then prejudice will have no check.
Justice Field's dissent argued with particular vigor against reasons two and three:
Yet no one will contend.that equal protection to women, to
children, to the aged, to aliens, can only be secured by allowing
persons of the class to which they belong to act as jurors in
cases affecting their interests.
The position that in cases where the rights of colored persons
are concerned, justice will not be done to them unless they
have a mixed jury, is founded upon the notion that in such
cases white persons will not be fair and honest jurors. If this
position be correct, there ought not be any white persons on the
jury where the interests of colored persons only are involved.
The jury would not be an honest or fair one, of which any of
its members should be governed in his judgment by other considerations than the law and the evidence; and that decision
would hardly be considered just which should be reached by a
sort of compromise, in which the prejudices of one race were
set off against the prejudices of the other. To be consistent,
those who hold this notion should contend that in cases affecting members of the colored race only, the jury should be composed entirely of colored persons, and that the presiding justice
should be of the same race. To this result the doctrine asserted
by the District Judge logically leads. The jury de medietate
linguae anciently allowed in England for the trial of an alien,
was expressly authorized by statute, probably as much because of the difference of language and customs between him
and Englishmen, and the greater probability of his defense
being more fully understood, as because it would be heard in
a more friendly spirit by jurors of his own country and lan18
guage.
The first excerpt is merely clever, and it should be given no more
weight than any other argument which premises our inability to
achieve complete justice and then concludes that we should not
achieve partial justice. It is true that everyone doesn't get peers, but
why not give this defendant his peers? Also, the purpose of the Civil
Is 100 U.S. 367, 368-69.
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War Amendments was to protect Negroes, not children, the aged, and
other similar groups.
The second excerpt is more than merely clever, and it raises fundamental issues. Indeed, it gives us the key to understanding why the
dichotomy of Strauder v. West Virginia and Virginia v. Rives was
born and why it remains with us despite the fact that if a black
defendant is harmed by the absence of blacks on his jury, he is
harmed even if the absence is by chance and not by design. Why,
then, did the majority not go further and guarantee to blacks the
right to have blacks on the jury? After all, as the dissenter Justice
Field said: "To this result the doctrine asserted. . . logically leads."
But the majority pulled back, however. One reason might be that
the doctrine "is founded upon the notion that in such cases white
persons will not be fair and honest jurors." One can not seriously
suppose that it was possible for an all-white judiciary to adopt, without reservation, the premise that "white persons will not be fair and
honest" towards blacks, and then follow up on all the logical consequences of this premise. Rather, we should expect the judiciary to
assume that it is both possible and normal for whites to be fair and
honest toward blacks.
Field is also close to a truth when he says that the trial of a black
man by a mixed black-white jury will lead to decisions "reached by
a sort of compromise, in which the prejudices of one race [are] set
off against the prejudices of another." Of course, one could argue that
such a dialectic is a good way to get justice. Yet we can understand
why the court did not accept as a premise that justice can be found
in the dialectic of prejudice, and then pursue the consequences of this
premise. To do so would be to give up the idea that decisions are
based upon the "law and the evidence." To adopt as a premise the
idea of the dialectic of prejudice would require the sacrifice of the idea
of the law as dispassionate neutrality.
By process of elimination, then, we come to the proposition that
the political dynamics argument is the crucial argument to the majority. One could argue that a different sort of harm is done when
harm is the result of chance than when harm is caused by a purposeful policy. Fate may be harsh, but malevolence is more harsh. It is
worse to lose one's property to a thief than to a natural calamity. To
use the language of current controversy, de jure segregation is worse
than de facto segregation. All of this seems true but not satisfying.
Granted that one is worse than the other, why not deal with both?
What is it about the political dynamics argument that captured the
imagination of the judges? One clue might be found in Field's reference to the jury de medietate linguae. As Field stated, it was

1976]

A JURY OF ONE'S PEERS

"anciently allowed in England for the trial of an alien;" the history
of its disappearance is relevant, although it will take quite a few
pages to demonstrate its relevance.
The archetypal alien in medieval society was the Jew. No one has
ever claimed that the relations of Christendom toward the Jews were
marked by any excess of Christian charity. But in 1201, King John
granted a "Charter of Liberties" to the Jews of England in which the
following appears, "if a Christian shall have a cause of action against
a Jew, let him be tried by the Jew's peers."' 9 A jury de medietate was
used in a 1278 case in which Isabel de Lockerley charged Cresse, son
of Lumbard, with rape. The sheriff was ordered to summons as the
jury "twelve Christians of Wilton and twelve Jews, as well as of the
town of Wilton."2
We need not imagine that the privileges granted by the Charter
of Liberties were a product of English liberalism. The editor of Selden
Society volume sums up the matter by writing:
the Jews were far too valuable a prey to be left by the Crown
to indiscriminate appropriation.'
An early statute of Jewry, part of the so-called Laws of Edward,
states:
Jews and all their effects are the King's property, and if anyone
withhold their money from them, let the King recover it as his
2
own.7
The Charter was a grant to the Jews of the necessary means of survival, the quid pro quo for being a source of revenue that the crown
could tap at whim. Isabel de Lockerley did not show up for the trial,
and so Cresse, son of Lumbard, was released and the mixed jury
empanelled in his case did not have to decide anything. The mixed
jury called to decide whether Hak of Canterbury and Abraham of
Dorking had killed Matthew of Ockham did render a verdict; they
said that the defendants were not guilty.? Most of the cases in the
Selden Society report, however, are commercial, rather than criminal, cases. For example, Joel of Blois, a goldsmith, sued Cresse, son
of Cresse, and the issue was whether Joel must pay 20s or 30s to
redeem a chattel that he had pledged to Cresse; a mixed jury said Joel
" 15 PUB. SELDEN SociEry 1 (1901).

21Id. at 104 (the place of the alleged crime was Wilton).
2I Id.
22Id.

2 Id. at 105-06.
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owed 30s.24 The index to the volume has an entry, "Jury, composition
of, cases illustrating"; 5 an examination of the material that is indexed shows that the mixed jury was common.
Given that the privilege of a mixed jury was granted to the Jews
for the reasons stated, what follows? One can interpret the event in
two different ways. We might say that it expresses a minimum. We
could emphasize the Jew's precarious position and lack of altruism
on the part of the Crown, and then argue that all could see that the
irreducible minimum of fair treatment for a minority is a mixed jury.
On the other hand, we can argue that it is an irrelevancy. We could
emphasize the place of the mixed jury in a scheme of exploitation,
and then argue that it has no place in free society.
Not all aliens were in so precarious a position as were the Jews;
consequently, the privilege of the mixed jury for other aliens can be
interpreted differently. In 1353, alien merchants were granted this
privilege."6 In 1354 the privilege was extended to all aliensY Professor
Thayer sums up the matter by saying that the privilege "was founded
on considerations of policy and fair dealings.

12 8

The "policy" that he

refers to was a crown policy to encourage foreign merchants and foreign artisans to come to England. Thayer shows good judgment by
using the conjunction "and", for there seems to be no way that one
could separate out the elements of "policy" and "fair dealing" and
say which predominates. Consequently, it is profitable to turn away
from England and examine the American response to this institution.
The American response to the jury de medietate linguae varied
over time. Published records that would show the relevant details
about jury selection in the eighteenth century are not available, but
there is some available evidence, and from that evidence we may infer
that the mixed jury was used in America until the first half of the
29
nineteenth century.
The first case upon which this inference may be based was a
24

Id. at 138.

SId.
27 Ed. Ill, stat. 2, c. 8.
28 Ed. III, ch. 13.
2 J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW, p. 94, n.
4 (1898).
,1 1 am indebted to Mr. Miller, see note 5 supra, for these cases that he collected
for a brief. His theory of the case was that the jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was understood to be a jury of peers, that the use of the mixed jury shows how
the requirement of peers was understood, and that this historical practice is relevant
by analogy to his case. Cf. Note, The Casefor Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531 (1970).
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Pennsylvania case decided in 1783.30 Four Italians were indicted for
murder and asked for a mixed jury. M'Kean, C.J., who was the trial
judge, granted their motion which was properly granted if the statute
28 Edw. 3, c. 13 had been followed in Pennsylvania prior to the
revolution. On this point defense counsel introduced an affidavit of
a Mr. Thomas Clifford, who had been the victim of a burglary; Mr.
Clifford stated that the accused, Frederick Ottenreed, was allowed a
jury de medietate linguae. On the basis of this precedent, M'Kean
ordered a mixed jury for the trial of Mr. Mesca and his co-defendants.
The case is evidence for the proposition that the mixed jury was
used in America in the eighteenth century. More interestingly, the
case report contains comments by M'Kean that prefigure the
nineteenth-century response. He followed precedent, but stated that
if he was not bound by precedent, if it were a case of first impression,
then he would have decided the case differently.
The reasons that gave rise to the 28 Edw. 3 do not apply to the
present government, nor to the general circumstances of the
country. Prisoners have here a right to the testimony of their
witnesses upon oath, and to the assistance of Counsel, as well
in matters of fact as of law, which was not the case in England
31
in the year 1353 when that statute was enacted.
With these words, M'Kean raises a fundamental problem of cultural transmission. In the years after the American revolution, American judges had to decide what parts of English law should be accepted and what parts rejected. With respect to the jury, the problem
was what parts of the English jury practice should be received.
M'Kean was correct in saying that in fourteenth century, criminal
defendants did not have a right to call witnesses nor did they have a
right to the assistance of counsel. However, this should be put in
context. Standard historical works such as Holdsworth 3 emphasize
that the early jury was both witness and judge. The jury were neighbors of the accused and were supposed to know the facts. This is not
to say that witnesses never appeared before the jury; but it was logical to deny the accused the right to call witnesses since in most cases
it would have been reasonable to suppose that the jury, neighbors of
the accused, would already know the facts. Thus, if anyone was to
have the right to call witnesses, it would seem logical to give this right
31Respublia

v. Mesca, 1 Dall. 73 (1783).
3' Id. at 75.
12 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 312-350 (1931).
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to the jury; they would know best when they were ignorant of some
crucial fact and when thus a witness might be helpful.
Given this context, an argument can be made either for or against
M'Kean's position. A proponent of M'Kean's position could say that
the mixed jury was logical in those days because the neighbors of the
accused, those who would know the facts, would be aliens. However,
the jury is now composed of those who are ignorant of the facts and
they judge the facts on the testimony of witnesses. The survival in
English law of the mixed jury after this change in function, which was
completed by the sixteenth century, is to be explained by cultural
inertia. Consequently, we ought not preserve this relic.
An opponent of M'Kean's position could respond by saying that
the survival of the mixed jury can be explained as more than mere
inertia. The function of the aliens on the jury in the fourteenth century was not solely to improve the fact-finding capability of the jury,
but also to improve upon its sense of fairness by acting as a check
against prejudice. This latter function, the check on prejudice, is as
valuable when the jury is fact-finder as it was when the jury was both
3
witness and fact-finder.
An evaluation of these opposing arguments is not easy. The logic
of each argument proceeds from certain assumptions about what the
function or rationale of the mixed jury was in the past and should be
now, and one can not assess the argument until one assesses the
assumptions. Unfortunately, determining the function and rationale
of an institution like the mixed jury is difficult.
M'Kean went on to say:
We do not think, indeed, that granting a medietas linguae,
will, at all, contribute to the advancement of justice; and we
know it is a privilege which the citizens of Pennsylvania cannot
reciprocally enjoy, as, at this day, there are no juries in any
part of Europe, except in the British dominions.Y
The part of the above sentence before the semi-colon would refer back
to the preceding discussion about changed circumstances or foreward
to the remarks on reciprocity or perhaps even to some third consideration that is not expressed. As for the point about reciprocity, the issue
is how much our treatment of aliens should be affected by the way
in which other countries treat aliens.
The next case is a New York case of 1807.1- An alien who was
3 Cf. Justice Strong's third argument, note 17 supra.
Id. at 75.
15 People v. McLean, 2 Johns. 380 (1807).
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charged with murder asked for, and was allowed, a jury de medietate
linguae; the jury convicted. The issue on appeal was the procedure
by which the mixed jury was summoned. The accused had asked that
the trial be delayed and the jury be summoned in the interim period
between the current term of court and the next term of court. The
trial court refused to delay the matter and summoned the jury immediately, or in the language of the day, "instanter." The details of
precisely how the jury was selected are not clear. The report says that
18 aliens and 18 citizens were summoned; the defendant was allowed
all of his challenges, and then a jury of 6 and 6 was empanelled. The
appellate court approved the trial court's procedure. The most interesting passage in the court's opinion is its reference to English history.
In the case of Count Koningsmark and others, tried for murder
in 1681 (3 St. Trials, 468), and of Swendson, (5 St. Trials, 449)
in 1702, for forcibly marrying Mrs. Rawlins, the prisoners
claimed the privilege of aliens, and strangers were impanneled,
6
and the prisoners tried on the same day.
The court showed that it was familiar with English practice and that
it judged this practice to be a legitimate model of how things ought
to be done.
In 1823, John Marshall and St. George Tucker, sitting as the
federal circuit court for the district of Virginia, granted a mixed jury
to an alien charged with piracy. The mixed jury convicted, and the
prisoner was sentenced to death. 3 The brief report has no discussion
by the judges, and the only part of counsel's argument that we have
is the following:
Albert Allmand, Esq., of counsel for the accused moved the
court to set aside half of the array, and allow to the prisoner
the substitution of the like number of foreigners,-a privilege,
sometimes accorded to alien criminals by our courts, and with
whom it is discretionary, but in regard to which there is no act
of Congress, although the state laws have a provision to that
effect. 8
It is unfortunate that the report contains no discussion of the matter
by two such distinguished judges as John Marshall and St. George
Tucker. It is intriguing to note, however, that counsel spoke of this
, Id. at 380-81.
United States v. Cartacho, 25 Fed. Cas. 312 (No. 14,738) (C.C.D. Va. 1823).
Id. at 312-13.
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privilege as discretionary as opposed to of right. The court granted
the motion, but whether they did so on a theory of right or of discretion we do not know; and if discretionary, the sort of considerations
that ought to inform one's discretion were not mentioned. Had the
greatest of the Federalist judges and the greatest of the Jeffersonian
judges discussed at length in a reported opinion the reasons they had
for granting the motion, they might have had an incalculable effect
on the course of American law.
If we turn to Tucker's Blackstone,39 there is little that deals directly with the problem, and that which indirectly bears upon the
problem is ambiguous. Blackstone discusses the jury de medietate
linguae in civil trials and the English author doubts whether the
ancient practice is still valid in civil cases.40 Tucker's note is brief
"Jurors de medietate linguae may be summoned by order of court.
L.V. 1794, c. 73 Sec. 13." The section cited is in fact just as brief; it
reads "Jurors de medietate linguae may be directed by the Courts
respectively." It is significant that the statute contains the word
"may," since this word is ordinarily used in statutes as a word
granting discretionary power, as opposed to "shall", which imposes
an obligation. 4 The overall impression that one would get on reading
Tucker's Blackstone is that this institution is peripheral. Both
Tucker and Blackstone were ardent believers in "natural rights",
albeit Tucker's list is longer and infused with Jeffersonianism, but
apparently neither of them thought of the jury de medietate as part
of the aliens' natural rights.
One thing that is not apparent from Tucker's note is that chapter
73 of the 1794 collection of Virginia laws regulates the grand jury and
petit jury in criminal cases. Why, then, is it appended to Blackstone's
discussion of the civil jury? The discussion of the criminal jury in
Blackstone does contain a short discussion of the matter:
Where an alien is indicted the jury should be de medietate, or
half foreigners, if so many are found in this place; (which does
not indeed hold in treasons, aliens being very improper judges
of the breach of allegiance; nor yet in the case of Egyptians
under the statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 10).12
Tucker has no note to this passage. I infer, perhaps wrongly, from this
3'For a general discussion of this work, published twenty years before the Cartacho case, see Cover, Book Review, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1475 (1970).
3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *360-61.
" See counsel's argument in United States v. Cartacho, 25 Fed. Cas. 312 (No.
14,738) (C.C.D. Va. 1823).
42 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 352.
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fault in exposition that Tucker did not think that the matter was
important.
Tucker's Appendix F to Volume I is a valuable clue to some of
his ideas that are arguably relevant to this matter. Appendix F is a
proposal for reforms for the jury system in Virginia. Tucker writes as
one who approves the jury in principle but is disturbed by the current
practice; it can be argued that the changes that he proposes are
inconsistent with the jury de medietate.
Tucker counts it as a major defect of the practice of his day that
juries were not composed of "the most respectable freeholders in the
county, men above the suspicion of improper biass (sic), or corruption; men whose understandings may be presumed to be above the
common level"43 but rather are composed of "idle loiterers about the
court, who contrive to get themselves summoned as jurors, that they
may have their expences (sic) borne."44 Thus, elitism is not inconsistent with Jeffersonianism; it may well be, of course, that in this matter
the elitism was justified. Let us pass by the factual issue of the actual
competence of the jurors and make instead a different assumption:
St. George Tucker's views were representative of a significant part of
the lawyers of Virginia. Then there are two possibilities: most of the
time jurors were incompetent, and the lawyers knew it; most of the
time the jurors were in fact competent, but despite this the lawyers
thought they were incompetent. Under either of the two possibilities,
bad results would follow. As a technical matter, the efficiency of trials
would be lessened.
"Hence the number of special verdicts, demurrers to the evidence,
and points reserved; which the parties, mutually apprehensive of a
decision by an incompetent jury, are ever ready to propose, or agree
to."' 5 Surely Tucker is correct in saying that if the parties believe the
jury to be incompetent, then they will be unwilling to submit the
matter in its entirety to the jury but will make technical maneuvers
to shift parts of the case to the judge. The evil here is not solely a
loss in efficiency but can lead to more important matters, as follows:
"Hence the number of new trials granted; because the jury
have not understood or have misapplied the evidence. Hence
in time, must result to the courts an influence in questions of
fact which may become highly pernicious."4
11APPENDIX of the Trial by Jury in Virginia, at 64.
Id.
Id. at 65.
, Id. at 64-65.
"
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Lack of confidence in juries will inevitably lead to transfer of the
juries' fact finding powers to the judge. To Blackstone and Tucker,
this would be a disaster, since they thought that one of the chief
guarantees against tyranny was the inability of the government to
deprive a man of his life, liberty, or property unless twelve of his
neighbors so decided. They believed, rightly or wrongly, that judges
would be less of a check, since judges would be more likely to have
political obligations to the government.
So, in order to restore confidence in the jury-it may be more
accurate to say, in order to restore Tucker's confidence in the jury-a
proposal was made; Appendix F contains a draft of a statute for
regulation of juries in civil and criminal cases. For purposes of this
article, the first two sections are relevant. In section one, the way in
which those eligible for jury duty were to be selected was set out. The
list was to be drawn from the tax rolls and was to be comprised of
those "whose property or estate within the county, whether real, personal or mixed, shall be rated on the said list of taxable property to
one hundred pounds, or more. . .. "I Section two provided that
judges should select from this list to serve as jurors "honest, discrett
and intelligent yeomen, freeholders, merchants and traders, citizens
of this commonwealth."" This section also contains some exclusions
from jury duty. Some of the exclusions seem routine: doctors, lawyers, clergy and government officials; others are not: tavern keepers,
distillers, or vendors of spirits by retail, overseers or managers of
plantations or mills for others, merchants' clerks, or shopkeepers,
journeymen, or apprentices. . . ."I' The proposed act does not mention the jury de medietate, and one could argue that it was not meant
to abolish it. However, it does express a strong preference for a jury
of men of substance and position, and thus it might be viewed as
inconsistent with the preservation of the jury de medietate.
Another relevant part of Tucker's Blackstone is Appendix L to
part II of Volume I, "Of the Rights of Aliens in the United States.""0
Blackstone had categorized persons as citizens, denizens, or aliens.'
Denizens were in a half-way house between alienage and citizenship;
a denizen enjoyed some of the privileges of citizens and suffered some
of the disabilities of aliens.52 An alien could become a denizen only
11Id. at 68.
49 Id.

41Id. at 69.

98-103.
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

5 APPENDIX,

'2

*

366-75.

"A denizen is a kind of middle state, between an alien and a natural-born
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by grace of the King, who in exercise of his prerogative could issue to
an alien "letters patent" making him an English subject. Naturalizaby a special Act of Parliament, making him an
tion could follow
53
English citizen.
Tucker could have said that these categories were irrelevant to
America and dismissed Blackstone's discussion as mere arcane
knowledge. Instead, he ingenuously adapted these categories to our
law. He reviewed the history of relevant legal materials from Queen
Elizabeth's charter to Sir Walter Raleigh to the U.S. Constitution
and the latest legislation of the Virginia legislature and the United
States Congress. He concluded that an alien sojourner would remain
an alien, but if an alien migrated to and settled in America then he
became a denizen. Having become a denizen, he now had a right
under general statutes to become a naturalized citizen. The chief
contrast of American with English law, as Tucker sets it out, is the
absence of discretion. In England, an alien could become a denizen
only by grace of crown; in America, he could become a denizen by
his own act of settlement. In England, a denizen could become naturalized only by special act of Parliament; in America, he need only
comply with procedures set out in general laws. Once an alien made
a permanent settlement, "he became a denizen, as of right, instantly;
he became naturalized upon payment of the legal fees for his letters
of naturalization, and upon taking the usual oaths. ' '54 Tucker sets out
all this fondly, with the unstated pride of a patriot. The relevance of
it all to the jury de medietate is that it cast doubt upon the concept
of alienage upon which the institution of the jury de medietate was
built. Tucker is laying the foundation for the argument that the alien
in America is a very different person than the alien in England.
The next significant case was decided in the supreme court of
North Carolina in 1825.11 An alien charged with murder asked for a
jury de medietate linguae. The trial court denied the request; on
appeal, the denial was affirmed, the court holding that there was no
error in denying a jury de medietate linguae. The report contains the
most elaborate discussion of the problem as of 1825; all three members of the court, which was split 2-1 on the issue, wrote an opinion.
The reporter's introduction to the opinions set out what appears to
be an excerpt from a colloquy of court and counsel that occurred
during argument.
subject, and partakes of both of them." Id. at *374.
Id. at *373-74.

5 APPENDIx at 99 (emphasis in original).

State v. Antonio, 11 N.C. 200 (1825).
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Henderson, J. [who voted that there was no right to a jury de
medietate] Judge Williams [who was not a member of the
supreme court] informed me that he allowed it at a court of
oyer and terminer held in Wilmington many years ago for the
trial of some prisoners who were aliens and natives of France.
Gaston [counsel for the prisoner]: It seems, then, to have been
considered the law; the Legislature has not since altered it."
Mr. Gaston's statement is a masterpiece of the art of advocacy; it is
accurate in every detail of what it says, it is persuasive, but it presents, of course, only one side of the question. The jury de medietate
was considered law by Judge Williams in those days, but by how
many other judges? The legislature has not done anything inconsistent with Judge Williams' view of the law, but has it adopted his view?
The question: did the legislature adopt Judge Williams' view of
the matter?, can be rephrased: Did the legislature adopt the statute
23 Edw. 111, ch. 13? The legislature did not review all the English
statutes, picking and choosing explicitly, that is to say, the legislature did not give the courts a list of English statutes with which to
work. Instead, the North Carolina legislature, like all the rest of the
state legislatures, stated general criteria by which the courts were to
decide which English statutes were to be adopted.
Judge Hall, whose opinion is the first one set out in the report,
translated the criteria of the statute into these terms: (1) was 28 Edw.
111, c. 13 "suitable and proper for the government and well-being of
the colonist?" and (2) was it "not

.

. repugnant to or inconsistent

with the freedom and independence of the state and form of government?" established since the revolution. 7 You may recall that I have
quoted Thayer as saying that the jury de medietate "was founded
upon considerations of policy and fair dealing."58 If considerations of
"fair dealing" were the key, then Judge Hall's two tests would be met,
but Judge Hall thought that considerations of "policy" were the key
and thus that his two tests were not met. His own language is:
But it seems to me that those statutes [providing for jury de
medietate] were in their nature local; they were founded more
in commercial policy than in general principles calculated to
answer alone the end of justice and reach the objects of criminal law.59
"' Id. at 202.
Id. at 205.
"' See note 28 supra.
State v. Antonio, 11 N.C. at 205.
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Judge Hall had some evidence upon which he could infer that
considerations of commercial "policy" outweighed the considerations
of "fair dealing." During the reign of Henry V, a statute was passed
setting certain qualifications for jurors; this statute did not state
explicitly whether the jury de medietate was to be affected by it, but
if so, then 28 Edw. III, ch. 13 was repealed. Subsequently, the courts
resolved this ambiguity by deciding that the new statute repealed 28
Edw. III, ch. 13. The Crown and Parliament responded by 8 Hen. VI,
ch. 29, which reaffirmed the alien's privilege to be tried by a jury de
medietate linguae. The preamble of the statute, which Judge Hall
quoted, states that the court's decision was unfortunate because of
the effect of loss of this privilege upon foreign merchants:
Many merchant aliens have withdrawn, and daily do withdraw
them, and eschew to come and be conversant on this side of
the sea, and likely it is that all the said merchant aliens will
depart out of the same realm of England if the said last statute
be not more fully declared, and the said merchant aliens ruled,
governed, and demeaned in such inquests according to the first
ordinance aforesaid [28 Edw. 111, ch. 13], to the great diminishing of the king's subsidies, and grievous loss and damage of
all of his said realm of England .... 10
Judge Hall went on to point out that those who colonized America
were for the most part farmers and that the policy of Parliament was
to exclude alien merchants from America, as they wished a monopoly
in trade in English hands.
Judge Henderson concurred with Judge Hall; he stated that he
agreed with all that his colleague said and he went on to discuss some
other matters. Judge Henderson stated that the line between alien
and non-alien was different in America than it had been in England.
[W]e find frequently bodies German, Swiss, and French settling among us, [and] the moment they arrived here. . . they
were considered as colonist, having no intention to return; and,
therefore, having no interests separate and distinct from other
colonists, they lost their alien character. 6'
Judge Henderson went on to say that if the use of the jury de
medietate had been widespread, this might outweigh other considera'

Id. at 205.

6,Id. at 207. Cf. St. George Tucker's analysis "of the Rights of Aliens in the United
States" supra, text at notes 50-54. The ideology here is that there are no aliens in
America, except those who have chosen to be alien.
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tions, but that JiUdge Williams' use of it "once or perhaps twice '6 2 was
not enough.
Chief Judge Taylor dissented. He was not persuaded by Hall's
account of history. The preamble of 8 Hen. VI, ch. 29. talked about
merchants, but the substantive provisions were not limited to merchants. Taylor argued that mechanics and artisans were also encouraged to settle in England. As for the colonies, while it is true that
foreign merchants were excluded so that trade with the colonies
would be an English monopoly, it is also true that there was a policy
of encouraging foreign agriculturalists and artisans to settle in Amer3
ica.1
The Chief Judge also said that history can give us no sure guides
and that it would be best to decide the case on general principles. In
his own words:
But though an alien of any description has at this day nothing
to fear from the operation of malignant passions, he might
labor under many disadvantages from our ignorance of his language and the customs of his nation. If these may be obviated
by allowing him a portion of his countrymen, or foreigners,
upon his jury, in case of life or death; if by these means he will
be better enabled to bring forward his defense to the considerations of the court and jury; and if there is no positive law
directing us, in plain and intelligible language, to disallow the
claim, it appears to me safer to follow in the footsteps of our
forefathers.64
The next important case was decided on St. George Tucker's
homeground of Virginia in 1841.11 Here, an Englishman who was
charged with perjury asked for a mixed jury. The trial court granted
the motion and ordered six citizens and six Englishmen summoned.
However, three of the Englishmen failed to appear and of the three
that did, one was challenged for cause. The defendant then asked
that more Englishmen be summoned, and the attorney for the Commonwealth admitted to the court that there were more Englishmen
in the county. However, the judge apparently did not want to delay
the case so he ordered the jury filled up with bystanders. The
accused was convicted, and he appealed. Although there were two
aliens on the jury, it was not a jury de medietate since two is not one62
'3
'
6

Id. at 208.
Id. at 210-12.
Id. at 213.
Richard v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 690 (1841).
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half of twelve. The case was treated as though de medietate had been
denied; the only relevant statute in 1841 read the same as it had in
St. George Tucker's day: "juries de medietate may be directed." The
court, per Duncan, J., fastened upon the word "may", pointed out
that this is a word giving discretion as opposed to imposing a duty,
and consequently held that the accused had not been deprived of any
rights. 6
Writing for the court, Judge Duncan went beyond the narrow
grounds for decision and discussed the wisdom of having a jury de
medietate. Although the court was not explicit about why it did so,
one can assume that the discussion was related to the holding about
discretion. Since the trial courts are to have discretion to grant or not
grant the jury de medietate, then the views of the appellate court
upon the wisdom of exercising that discretion would be appropriate.
As to general policy, the court pointed out that in England aliens
could not become citizens, and so the privilege was proper compensation for this disability, particularly in light of a policy to encourage
immigration. The court argued that in this country things were different. Aliens could become citizens; they were scattered all over the
countryside and not grouped or confined to certain places as they
were in England; three-fourths of the aliens spoke our language; the
continued flow of immigration led to no prejudice against aliens.
Furthermore, there would be practical problems. The sheriff would
find it difficult to summons aliens, since they were dispersed and
since he had no easy way of knowing who was an alien and who a
citizen."
In addition to policy issues and practical problems, the court went
on to discuss what it called "anomalies" of the jury de medietate. A
citizen was tried by a jury whose members have met a property qualification, which is supposedly a test of fitness, but if de medietate were
used, an alien could have a jury one-half of whom would be "fugitive
and vagabonds, the 'scum of the old world cast upon our shores.' "68
Furthermore, such a jury would not be impartial and interested in
justice since one-half of the jurors would be "aliens, probably his
countrymen, peradventure his associates, men like himself, with no
" Judge Duncan's opinion states the matter in a highly technical fashion. In
England, the common law rule had been that aliens could get a mixed jury only by

way of a discretionary exercise of the royal prerogative. Such statutes as 28 Edw. III,
ch. 13, and 8 Hen. VI, ch. 29, gave the alien a right to have a mixed jury. The Virginia

statutes adopt the common law rule of discretion. Id. at 692-93.
'1 Id. at 695. Cf. the text supra at note 61.
"1

Id. at 696; the court gave no source for its quotation 'scum ... shores.'
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interest in the country, indifferent to its laws, and reckless of its
peace."69
Robertson, J., dissented. He pointed out that the word "may" in
the present code was copied from earlier versions and could be traced
back through successive revisions to 1788;1o he appears to have been
concerned that the word "may" was not used in a technical sense in
those days. He noted that we can not know when and how the jury
de medietate was used in earlier times, but that in the modern days
he understood that it had been awarded several times, and he himself
saw Judge Brockenbrough order it.7' The inference is apparently that
this institution was reasonably well established in Virginia practice.
Finally, Judge Robertson argued that discretion was particularly
undesirable in a matter such as this; it would be least likely to be
exercised when most needed. 2
In subsequent cases in which the matter was discussed, the
courts were brief in their treatment. 3 The right is denied, and the
issue dies. Chief Justice Hughes summed up our history when he said
by way of dictum:
Although aliens are within the protection of the Sixth Amendment, the ancient rule under which an alien might have a trial
by jury de medietate linguae

. . .

no longer obtains.74

A review of the arguments about the jury de medietate linguae
will show that only Judge Duncan of Virginia expressed prejudice
against the alien. The expressed reason for denying to aliens this
ancient right was that things had changed. In America, unlike in
England, an alien was not permanently an alien; by the exercise of
his own free will he could become a citizen. Consequently, he did not
need this ancient special privilege, or perhaps, did not deserve it.
Possibly those who believe that exclusion of blacks from juries is bad
but inclusion is unnecessary have an argument like this one in mind.
Exclusion de jure of blacks from juries would make blacks, like aliens
in England, permanent outsiders. However, once this formal exclusion is eliminated, there is no need for any special treatment. Consequently, it can be argued that Judge Field's obscure reference to the
, Id. at 697.

12 HENING 730, § 44.
" Richard v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. at 701.
70

" Id. at 708.

,' State v. Fuentes, 5 La. Ann. 427 (1850); People v. Chin Mook Sow, 5 Cal. 597
(1877); Wendling v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.E. 205 (1911).
7
United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936).
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jury de medietate illuminates the political dynamics argument very
nicely. Politics involves many things, but one of the things it involves
is putting together coalitions so that a decision can be made on public
issues. In this context, one of the fundamental questions is whose
views must be taken into account, who is eligible to be a member of
a coalition, or in other words, who is a citizen. An alien can become
a citizen by complying with certain general laws; the Negro has been
made a citizen by the Civil War amendments. Therefore, there is no
political reason for special juries. Of course, there is an unstated
major premise, i.e., that formal political equality is not merely necessary but is also sufficient.
The arguments pro and con as to the jury de medietate linguae
did not occur in a vacuum; other arguments were developing on related topics. Perhaps the best summary of the arguments in this area
is David Rothman's book The Discovery of the Asylum (1971). The
first paragraph of the introduction states the crux of the book:
The question this book addresses can be put very succinctly:
why did Americans in the Jacksonian era suddenly begin to
support institutions for deviant and dependent members of the
community? Why in the decades after 1820 did they all at once
erect penitentiaries for the criminal, asylums for the insane,
almshouses for the poor, orphan asylums for homeless children, and reformatories for the delinquents? Although interpretations of the cause may differ, there can be no disputing
the fact of the change. Here was a revolution in social practice.715
I will discuss only the parts of Rothman's book that talk about criminals, but the quoted passage shows that what happened in criminal
law was typical of nineteenth century social practice, not exceptional.
During the eighteenth century, crime was part of the natural order
of things; crime, like sin, was a product of man's depravity. To search
for other causes would be silly; to hope for its elimination would be
7
daft.
In the years immediately after the revolution, Enlightenment
ideas spread; for the criminal law, this meant Cesare Beccaria's treatise On Crimes and Punishments. Beccaria's thesis was that if laws
were simple, if punishment were certain and humane, then crime
would be reduced. Eliminate the barbarism inherited from feudal7 D. RoTwMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM xiii (1971).
' Id. at 14-20.
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ism, embrace the humane rationalism of the Enlightenment, and all
would be well. As an explanatory scheme about crime, it moved the
cause of deviance away from the criminal's depravity and into the
legal system."
Laws were reformed, but by 1820 most people no longer were
persuaded of Beccaria's thesis; despite reforms, crime remained.
Rothman illustrates the next change by citing appendices of a set of
reports made by the inspectors of New York's Auburn penitentiary
to the New York state legislature in 1829 and 1830. The appendices
were short biographical sketches of inmates. The implicit premises in
these sketches were that adult deviance could be related to some
significant event in childhood, and the significant event was always
the collapse of family control. The logic of causation was without
family control, no discipline; without discipline, susceptibility to the
8
temptations of the world; and to yield to temptation leads to crime.
Given this diagnosis, the cure was evident; remove the criminal
from temptation and inculcate discipline. Once disciplined, he would
be able to return to the world and resist temptation. Given that the
prisoner was not inherently depraved, there were no limitations to
what a well managed prison environment could achieve. 7 These were
the sorts of arguments that the reformers made when they lobbied for
new penitentiaries. Whether the legislators and their constituents
were persuaded by these arguments or whether they gave their support for different reasons is perhaps impossible to know. The reformers dream, of course, failed. Whatever the reason for the failure, the
discipline of the penitentiary became an end in itself, the penitentiary became a place of mere custody, and the prisoners were mostly
lower class and alien. 0 While this was happening, aliens lost their
right to a jury de medietate linguae.
Not only was there a change in the way we dealt with criminals,
but the institution of the jury changed in some fundamental ways
during the nineteenth century. In 1794, Chief Justice John Jay instructed a jury that although courts were "the best judges of law"
that the jury had the "right to take upon

. .

. [themselves] to judge

of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy." 1
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court repudiated this position.82 The Su" Id. at 59-61.

"' Id. at 64-68.

Id. at 80.
"'

Id. at 252-57.

'z

Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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preme Court was not the innovator in this change; it merely puts its
imprimatur upon changes made by other judges. If anyone deserves
the claim of innovator, it is Lemmanuel Shaw, who as Chief Justice
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrote in 1855 the opinion that the majority of justices on the U.S. Supreme Court relied
upon.
The exclusion of juries from questions of law was part of a general
change in attitudes toward the jury. In the early days of the Republic,
legal writers adopted without reservation Blackstone's view that the
jury was the "palladium of liberty."" The colonial experience of colonial juries and royal judges had added patriotic fervor to such declarations. In this context, the jury's right to decide questions of law was
the technique by which the natural rights of citizens could be protected. By the end of the nineteenth century, the judges agreed that
the jury's proper role was to decide facts. Nor was there solid confidence in the jury's reliability for this job, for the nineteenth century
also saw the development of techniques of jury control such as directed verdicts."
These two trends, the growth of the penitentiary and the decline
of the jury, may be related to each other. The reformers' diagnosis of
the immediate cause of crime was lack of discipline, with the more
remote cause being the weakened family. The social reality of crime
is that criminals are for the most part lower class. A possible explanation of this is that for many of those who are lower class, a life of crime
is a rational, perhaps the best available, use of their talents. However,
if we are to believe Rothman, the apologists for the penitentiary
believed that the lower classes were undisciplined. If the judges were
persuaded by this sort of talk, their attitudes toward jurors might be
affected. The judges would believe that deciding cases "on the law
and the evidence" requires a disciplined mind, the sort of mind the
judge believes himself to have. A temptation that seduces the judge
is for him to say that the best juror is a person who is just like
himself.86 In so far as the jurors are not just like the judges, and in so
far as the difference is perceived by the judges as a lack of discipline,
then to that extent the judges will use their power to try to curb the
jurors.
" Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185 (1855).

See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
See generally, Note, The ChangingRole of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century,
74 YALE L. J. 170 (1964). St. George Tucker had warned that this development was
likely; see text at note 46 supra.
" This elitist view remains popular. For a recent expression of it, see Redish,
Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 486, 502-08 (1975).
'
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The jury de medietate linguae is merely a special case of the
problem. The alien is most likely to be lower class and his crimes to
be lower class crimes. 7 The power and status of the jury was going
down, and so it is no surprise that the alien's special privilege went
down also. By 1880, the date of Virginia v. Rives, all of these changes
were substantially complete. In this context, it is not surprising that
the court held the way that it did: blacks may not be excluded from
the jury, but they need not be included in the jury. What would be
surprising would have been a holding that blacks must be included.
It would be rational to set out to affirmatively include blacks on juries
if one intended to give the jury an expansive role and further saw the
value of having divergent insights brought to the jury, yet this was
not the policy that was being followed. The role of the jury was being
limited, not expanded. Nor is it likely that the men of the nineteenth
century would have seen the inclusion of blacks as bringing a valuable special insight; by the ideology of the day, disorder and lack of
discipline would have been the result.
The tone of the last several paragraphs is critical of the ideology
that supports the decision in Virginia v. Rives. However, a rejection
of the old ideology is not a sufficient reason for overruling the case of
Virginia v. Rives. We mean by ideology a theory that is held for
reasons other than the truth of the theory, generally for reasons of
power. If we reject the old ideology, how can we make sure that the
theory that we substitute for it is a theory that is true and not merely
a new ideology? And if we get a new theory that is true, will it follow
from it that Virginia v. Rives should be over-ruled or re-affirmed?
These abstract questions can be put in concrete terms. A more concrete way of asking these questions is to ask: If we establish a principle that blacks should be affirmatively included on juries, what will
be the consequences? Will they be better, and how can we know?
Take, for example, the actual case set out above of the pimp, his
woman, and the victim. Would the accused, the pimp, have been
helped by the requirement that there be blacks on the jury? Probably
not. Most of the blacks who live in Onslow County, North Carolina
are also fundamentalist in their religion.m This particular group of
blacks would not likely be sympathetic to the accused and many of
them might be more harsh than whites, in that they would regard him
as a particular disgrace and embarrassment to them.
" See text at note 80 supra.
"I make this observation from my own memory of Onslow County from the days
when I was stationed at Camp Lejeune.
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In trying to find a solution to a problem one ought not forget what
the problem is. We ought to have a reasonable number of the accused's peers on the jury. By "peers", I mean those who have enough
in common with the accused, or who have enough sympathy for the
accused, to be able to give a realistic evaluation of his story. How are
we to know who might be able to do this? Who is going to make such
decisions?
Perhaps the way to begin to answer these questions is to look at
current practice in jury selection. By reputation, the maestro is
Charles Garry. Consequently, we can count ourselves fortunate that
Garry's voir dire in the Huey Newton trial has been published. 9 We
are doubly fortunate in that the volume contains an essay" on the
problem by Prof. Robert Blauner, a sociologist at Berkeley. Professor
Blauner served as an expert on the defense staff in two capacities; he
testified in support of defense challenges to the master jury panel by
saying that the method of selecting the panel aggravated rather than
minimized the exclusion of blacks from the jury; he also advised the
defense during voir dire as to selection criteria that would minimize
racism. As to the first, the relevant fact was that in Alameda county
the jury list was drawn up by selecting from the list of registered
voters. Professor Blauner's testimony, together with that of other
experts, was that the "registered voter" criteria was not neutral with
regard to race or class and that a jury drawn in this way could not
be a representative cross-section of the community."
As to the second, his advice to the defense during voir dire,
Professor Blauner does not tell us very much about his own contributions. Instead, he gives us a thoughtful description of the way counsel
questioned prospective jurors and exercised their challenges. At the
end of the essay, he makes suggestions.
Blauner is quick to see that rational strategy for a trial lawyer is
inconsistent with the goal for a jury as stated in constitutional
norms.2 The norms state that the jury ought to be a representative
cross-section of the community. However, some parts of a community
may be hostile to one side or the other in any given case. Counsel will
try to exclude this part from the jury; the obvious reason is that it is
easier to persuade a juror who is not hostile than a juror who is
hostile, and counsel's job is persuasion. Huey Newton was charged
with murdering a policeman; the witnesses for the prosecution were
" A. GINGER, ed., MINIMIZING RACISM IN JURY TRIALS (1969) [hereinafter cited as
GINGER].
"

"

Id. at 43-73.

Id. at 220-29.
Id. at 53.
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all white policemen, and the witnesses for the defense were all blacks.
Garry, for the defense, wanted to exclude any white who had a policeman for a friend, while Jensen, the prosecutor, wanted to exclude
every black who lived in the ghetto. Each was rather successful in his
strategy, and thus the panel became non-representative; or rather, to
be more precise, a panel that was not representative became even less
representative.
Let us turn to the details of Garry's conduct, since it is relevant
to our theme, beginning with Blauner's description of Garry's style.
Garry. . . often made his decisions [about challenges] on the
basis of an intuitive hunch about the prospective jurors...
Garry's quick intuition is aided by the force of his personality.
Unlike Jensen, whose neutral, bland style evokes a response in
kind, Garry relates to prospective jurors quite personally. Expressing feelings freely, his strong presence makes it difficult
for the other to maintain a neutral stance. Thus while many
are 'won over', the hostility of some became explicit and this
aided the counsel in sizing them up."
It is reasonably clear from Blauner's account that the prospective
juror's answers to questions were less important to Garry than the
way the question was answered, all the subtle clues and demeanor by
which we reveal ourselves. Indeed, the questions themselves were at
times not designed to get information, but for some other purpose:
An elderly woman who was to become one of the regular jurors
admitted that she had some subjective feelings of racism. Instead of following this up with the obvious query-"Tell me
what some of those feelings are," he continued: "And because
of these subjective-some subjective feelings you have, do you
make allowances for your own shortcomings in that regard?"
She answered "yes," and although a graduate student would
flunk a test in social research for such an obvious error, Garry's
method may have been the successful one for his purpose. The
woman turned out to be one of the "best" jurors from the
defense standpoint. Perhaps the persuasive effect of Garry's
"too-direct" question was more valuable in "educating" this
woman than the information that a "better" wording might
have gleaned. 4
,3 Id. at 52.
" Id. at 60.
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I would add a surmise that Garry had probably determined from her
demeanor in answering the first question that she was able to setaside or compensate for whatever prejudice that she might have, so
he asked the second question not only to "educate" but also to strike
up a rapport. His question was a compliment to her, and she probably
appreciated it.
If we turn for precedent to the classical rhetoricians and use their
terminology, we can say that Garry relies on ethos instead of pathos
or logos. The persuasiveness of Garry's own arguments will depend
upon his character and presence, i.e., his ethos, and so he is concerned with the character, the ethos, of the jury. 5 Consider the following excerpt:
A retired small businessman first referred to black people as
"colored," an old-fashioned expression which often indicates a
prejudiced orientation. But because he was old and foreignborn, we attributed this usage to the norms of his generation.
Later he spoke of an unfortunate experience with a "colored
boy" who turned out to be 25 years old. When Mr. Garry
pointed out that Negro adults don't particularly appreciate
being called boys, the man seemed genuinely surprised. Rather
than acting defensively, he appeared to understand and to
have learned something from the exchange. 6
Garry did not challenge him.
For a further example of character analysis, consider the following:
A similar [referring to the above] openness and honesty was
conveyed by a middle-aged saleslady . . . Though by no
means politically left or even "liberal," she appeared to be a
woman who had thought about racial matters, someone who
habitually wrestled with her conscience. She admitted being
very upset when a Black Panther spokesman appeared before
her church discussion group and accused all white Christians
of being racists. His speech and her anger had made her think
quite a bit. 7
People who expressed "liberal" views were not automatically accepted. If the expression of "liberal" views had about it "a quality of
'"

For a recent and imaginative commentary on this classical trichotomy, see J.
806-821 (1973).

WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION
"1

GINGER,

97 Id.

note 89 supra, at 64.
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smugness,"98 if the liberal seemed overly righteous about his views,
then Garry was likely to challenge.
Toward the end of his essay, Professor Blauner summarizes his
own views as to how one can minimize racism in a jury comprised
largely of whites; he offers "four tentative criteria."9 The first criterion is self-consciousness: a white should not deny and suppress his
prejudices, but rather should be aware of them and try to reduce their
impact. The second criterion is knowledge: a white should know
about black history and the circumstances of black life in America.
The third criterion is experience: the white should have contact with
blacks in work, friendship and residence. The fourth criterion is
activity: the white should be engaged in some activity to combat
prejudice.' Professor Blauner does not suggest which, if any, of these
criteria are the more important.
How do Blauner's criteria compare with Garry's practice? Both
are directed toward finding out about the ethos, the character, of the
prospective juror. Blauner's criteria sound on first reading as though
they are objective, in comparison to Garry's subjective and intuitive
practice, but they are not. Of course, it is possible to argue about how
such words as "subjective" and "objective" should be used. The word
"objective" can be used to mean that observers agree in their description of what they see. If we turn to Garry's practice in his interrogation of prospective jurors, we can recall that two characteristic features of it were: one, he wanted jurors who were open, rather than
closed, in their views; and two, he wanted jurors with whom he could
strike a rapport, rather than someone who was distant or cold. This
is the sort of thing that observers could witness and then agree upon.
When we watch two people talk, we can and do agree about such
things as their hostility or openness or friendliness towards each
other. Of course, it is also fair to say that Garry's methods were
intuitive. We often use the word "intuitive" to describe actions that
are made quickly, without calculation, and Garry made decisions in
that way. Furthermore, it is fair to say that Garry's methods were
subjective. We often use the word "subjective" to describe actions for
which one cannot state reasons, and Garry might not be able to state
why he made his judgments the way that he did. Indeed, our observers, objective in that they agree, might be subjective in this sense. A
smile might accompany an answer, and we might characterize it as
snide, or rueful, or knowing, or reluctant. We might agree as to which
"

g9

Id. at 65.
Id. at 67.

A JURY OF ONE'S PEERS

1976]

it was, but be unable to give a geometrical description of the coordinates of the edges of the lips and other features and so distinguish it
by unambiguous description. Note that there are similar problems
with Blauner's criteria. What is to count as activity, experience, or
knowledge? And how much? As for self-consciousness, how will we
determine this? Not only whether certain things are said, but whether
they are also said sincerely. In short, whatever the differences, and I
suspect there are none, such words as "objective" or "subjective"
won't mark them out. More importantly, there is a striking similarity; Blauner's criteria also require a "hearing." That is, there is no
way to administer Blauner's criteria without calling the prospective
juror into the jury box, with judge and both counsel present, and
asking questions, and making judgments about close cases. We could
not tell a sheriff to go out and apply the criteria, and bring in the jury.
Consequently, this way of avoiding racism has administrative consequences that are quite different from proposals about mixed juries;
for the latter the sheriff could do most of the job.
As I stated above," °' Garry's practice does not generate a jury that
accords with our constitutional norms. The most recent re-statement
of those norms is found in Taylor v. Louisiana. ' In that case,the
court re-iterated the rule that the jury must be drawn from a representative cross-section of the community and held that the exclusion
of women from the jury violated that rule. In the course of his opinion
for the court, Justice White discussed the Federal Jury Selection Act
of 1968:103
In passing this legislation, the Committee Reports of both the
House and the Senate recognized that the jury plays a political
function in the administration of law and that the requirement
of a jury's being chosen from a fair cross section of the community is fundamental to the American sense of justice.10 4
In a footnote, Justice White quoted from the following:
It must be remembered that the jury is designed not only to
understand the case, but also to reflect the community's sense
of justice in deciding it. As long as there are significant departures from the cross-sectional goal, biased juries are the re'®

Id. at 67-68.

,o2See text at note 92 supra.

95 S. Ct. 692 (1975).
Pub. L. No. 90-274, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq. (1970).
' 95 S. Ct. at 697.
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suit-biased in the sense that they reflect a slanted view of the
community they are supposed to represent." 5
Justice White summarized the matter by saying:
The purpose of the jury is to guard against the exercise of
arbitrary power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or
mistaken prosecution and in preference to the professional or
perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge.'
Of course, Justice White put a caveat on the norm in a passage
that re-iterates the logic of Virginia v. Rives, a duty not to exclude
does not entail a duty to include:
It should be emphasized that in holding that petit juries must
be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community
we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen
must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive
groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury
of any particular composition . . ., but the jury wheels, pools
of names, panels or venires from which juries are drawn must
not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative
thereof.'07
Is this conclusion wise? Should we require the trial jury to be a
representative cross-section of the community? The answer to this
question is not easy, but it is relevant to ask: if we did make such a
requirement, would it do any good? My position is that a good jury
is a jury that can make a fair evaluation of the testimony. I would
further argue that a jury that is sympathetic yet not partisan can best
do the job. There remains only one problem: how do we get such a
jury in a reasonable number of cases. Any rational person, given a
choice between a jury selected by the maestro or a jury that is a
random cross-section, would choose the former. There is only one
Charles Garry, so the problem is whether the average lawyer using
normal voir dire will get a better jury than some randomizing scheme.
To be candid, I know of no way to prove anything about this matter
one way or another. My instincts are to prefer human judgment, but
I can not be confident of anything because I do not know what the
Ibid, n.7, quoting from H.R. Rep. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess, p. 8.
"

Id. at 698.

"o

Id. at 702.
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future holds for the practice of voir dire. Current practice differs
widely from place to place, the matter has become controversial, and
we are sure to see many proposals for changes in the near future.' °8
The recent case of Ristaino v. Ross"°9 leaves future developments
of this area of law open for experiment. The court pulled back from
any extension of its precedents on voir dire so as to create constitutional standards that the states must observe, but it stated that it
would go further in creating standards of voir dire that federal courts
must observe. In particular, the court stated that .the voir dire question that it would not require a state court judge to ask in the Ristaino
case would be a required question in a federal court. 110 In short, the
Supreme Court has refused to constitutionalize this part of the law
and has instead left it open to ordinary statutory and decisional development. Consequently, there is no way to predict how the law of
voir dire will develop, but there is a substantial risk that voir dire will
be emasculated in the name of efficiency. What is the alternative to
the uncertain prospects for voir dire? Suppose we have a master list
that is a representative cross-section of the community. Is it possible
to assure that the trial jury is also a representative cross-section? How
could it be done? First of all, one would have to curtail sharply, and
perhaps eliminate entirely, the currently used challenge procedures."' As long as counsel can play a role, they will be rational and
try to change the skew away from a representative cross-section to a
non-representative cross-section, favorable to one side. It is folly to
expect counsel to behave in any other way. However, eliminating
challenges, or at least peremptory challenges would be unpopular
with many people and might even raise constitutional problems. As
a substitute for challenges, the judge would have to exercise enough
control over the selection of the trial jury to make sure that the trial
jury was as representative a cross-section of the community as the
master list. The problem is that the master list is a cross-section in
the statistical sense. As a statistical matter, we can be confident that
the differing perspectives on life that the community contains are
represented on the jury without knowing who on the list represents
what. Yet if we try to pick twelve people from this list, we can not
be confident that the statistics will preserve the representation; we
need to know who represents what.
"I See, e.g., Note, Voir Dire: EstablishingMinimum Standards to Facilitatethe
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1493 (1975).
'
1W
'

96 S. Ct. 1017 (1976).
Id. at 1022.

See text at notes 92 and 101 supra.
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More specifically we must be clear about what we mean by the
phrase: "a representative cross-section." The ma2ter list or the trial
jury could be a cross-section of the community in at least two different ways. We might have a cross-section of ideas or a cross-section of
social characteristics. It is clear enough from Garry's practice, that
he believes that the jurors' attitudes and ideas are what are important. The House Report on the Federal Jury Selection Act of 19681' 1
stated that the goal was a jury that would "reflect the community's
sense of justice" and that a biased jury is a jury that reflects "a
slanted view of the community." Thus, those who purport to know
are interested in a cross-section of ideas. However, even if our master
jury lists are made up properly, the only thing we can be sure of is
that they are a cross-section of social characteristics.
Our hope is that a socially diverse master list will also be ideologically diverse. As a statistical proposition, this is a fair assumption.
However, if the trial judge were to draw from this list a jury of twelve
that would resemble the classic New York City "balanced ticket"one Jew, one Italian, one Irish, one Negro, one Puerto Rican, and so
forth-there is no reason to believe that the resulting jury would be
ideologically diverse. The "balanced ticket" has ethnic diversity,
but it does not have occupational diversity. Surely no one would
believe that an ethnically diverse group of bank clerks would be
ideologically diverse.
The alternative of letting the trial judge go directly to ideological
diversity is unacceptable. This alternative would require that we give
the trial judge the power to question jurors about their attitudes and
then select a jury of diverse attitudes. I can't imagine that many
judges would want such an awesome responsibility, and I would be
suspicious of any judge that did.
The only feasible compromise would be to seek a jury with occupational diversity, but this would present technical problems. We
would have to take the standard tricotomy of white collar, blue collar,
unemployed, and break it down into a finer set of categories. Assuming that this could be done, the main problems would be political.
The occupational exemptions of our present statutes would have to
be eliminated,"' and there would be opposition to the change. Most
importantly, the change would require public acceptance of the
Marxist proposition that class determines beliefs. For worse or for
,,2 See text at notes 89-98 supra.
,, See text at notes 103-05 supra.
'

See, e.g.,

CODE OF VIRGINIA,

§ 8-208.6. (Supp. 1975).
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better, it would be a wrenching change for our lawmakers to offer an
allegiance to Karl Marx.
Another possibility is for the prosecutor and the defense counsel
to agree to have a diverse jury. For example, in the case presented at
the beginning of this article, why not have a jury comprised of half
customers and half entrepreneurs? More generally, why could not the
prosecution and the defense agree to a jury one-half of which was
representative of the victim and one-half of which was representative
of the accused? The only prerequisite is trust and. good faith, but to
state the prerequisite is to demonstrate its non-existence.
If none of these alternatives is chosen, we shall have to continue
with the voir dire techniques that we now know. It would be possible
to speculate on the comparative merits of the several alternatives,
but it would probably be useless to do so. There is no evidence that
changes in jury practice in the past have ever been made on the basis
of comparative merit, and there is no reason to believe that things
will be different in the future. Changes in jury practice have been a
function of more profound changes in political belief. What changes
might be ahead? Which of these changes might be relevant to jury
practice?
The most important change that could occur would be a change
in the way we understand the criminal. The criminal has been
thought of as depraved and sinful. Alternatively, the criminal has
been thought of as a product of his environment. Consider the following:
[A] criminal is someone who has chosen to engage in criminal
activity because the expected utility of such activity to him,
net of expected costs, is greater than that of any legitimate
alternative activity."'
To Posner, everyone is a utility maximiser, and so the ultimate point
of the excerpt is that the criminal is just like the rest of us. The
Posner excerpt is applicable here because he says, in his own peculiar
way, what may be becoming the new belief-the criminal is a person,
a human, just like any one else.
There is no way to predict what changes will occur, particularly
what the details might be. However, the most significant change that
could occur would be a change that would regard criminals as ordinary humans. This sort of change would be an abandonment of elitism, and if we were not elitists we would also admit the jury into a
"I'
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larger role in our system. If this were so, we could find ways to see
that the community was represented in all of its richness. One suspects that all of the technical problems could be overcome if there
were a fundamental change in our political ideology. However, I have
no clues as to the likelihood of such a change.

